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Abstract
Mechanistic individualism versus organistic totalitarianism
In this article it is argued that the organistic world picture, when 
functioning as a world view, is associated with a totalitarian view o f  social 
relationships, usually promoting the interests o f  the state or the ethnic 
group as the interests which should dominate. This is illustrated by 
referring to the social ideas o f Hobbes, Rousseau, D.H. Lawrence and 
Mussolini. The mechanistic world picture, however, when functioning as a 
world view, is associated with individualism, according to which the 
individuals have a relatively independent existence; it suggests that justice 
and morality are the automatic products o f  the equilibrating process.
Cases in point: Hobbes, Adam Smith, Kant, Darwin, New-Classical and 
Monetarist economics. Finally (in Neo-Calvinist vein) it is argued that the 
application o f  such worldviewish metaphors should be limited, so that 
justice can be done to both the differentiation o f  social relationships and 
their integration.
1. Background
M ain thesis: Each extreme o f social thinking, individualism and 
totalitarianism bases itself on some idea o f ultimate reality: 
individualism is associated with a mechanistic p icture o f  the universe 
(applied to social life), and totalitarianism with an organistic picture 
o f  the universe. Such pictures become or are world views which 
determine and give meaning to the behaviour o f  persons toward  
aspects o f  the world  interpreted in terms o f these pictures {in casu 
social reality), i.e. these pictures determine what reality “in essence” is, 
in totality and in detail (even when the picture itself is acknowledged to 
be a metaphor).
It seems as if human beings, as beings with self-consciousness, continually return 
to the question o f “the meaning of life” . Why do 1 live at all? Why shouldn’t we 
all commit suicide? Who am I with regard to other self-conscious beings? Why 
expect different behaviour from me than from lions? Pictures o f the universe play
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an orientating role with regard to such questions: they provide metaphorical 
explanations o f “macrocosmic” patterns; they also provide maps which guide 
human beings through life, and relate the individual human being to other possible 
beings, giving mankind a status and some aims. They can also serve to explain 
the peculiarities o f social structures and the relationship o f the individual towards 
them.
Although one can possibly picture the universe in an infinite number o f  ways, two 
pictures seem to have dominated Western thought: an ancient one, according to 
which the universe is a living being (the organistic picture); and a modem one, 
dating from the seventeenth century, viewing the universe as a machine (the 
mechanistic one).
Ancient people had no other way o f explaining the movements o f heavenly bodies 
than by modelling them according to self-moving things from within their horizon 
o f  experience, i.e. living things (especially human beings). The universe thus 
came to be viewed as an eternal, and therefore divine living being, populated by 
smaller living beings, some eternal (the heavenly bodies; the “ spirits”), some 
mortal or partially mortal (human beings, animals, plants; cf. Venter, 1996:1-5).
It was only after the advent o f apparently lifeless automata that W estern man 
could conceive o f  the dynamics o f the universe in terms o f a different metaphor: 
that o f  an automaton, with a creator god as its engineer and maintenance 
mechanic (Venter, 1992a: 190-198; cf. also Hooykaas, 1972:61 ff; Dijksterhuis, 
1950).
From a physical point o f  view the pictures have been functioning as models, in 
the sense that they are explanatory metaphorical standardisations (cf. Santema, 
1978:2-26) which serve as frames o f reference for the understanding o f  the 
physical interrelationships in the universe at large. Both pictures, however, have 
also been functioning as suggestive metaphors, life maps and compasses, which 
guide individual and social praxis. They have, therefore, in fact become life-and- 
world views, which determine norms, values, and the structuring o f social 
relationships, as Santema also noticed (1978:7ff). One could even say that from a 
scholarly point o f view, they provided (seemingly) successful ways o f 
explanation, prediction and the determination o f regularities with implicit world 
views, and therefore show the characteristics of what Kuhn called a “paradigm”, 
and some o f those he later included under “disciplinary matrix” (Kuhn, 1975: 
174fl).
It is not always easy to determine whether, for any specific adherent, the specific 
picture adopted functioned as only a metaphor through which the world is made 
intelligible and meaningful, or whether the world is supposed to be a real living 
organism or a real machine. There may (proportionally) be more mechanistic
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thinkers who believed their descriptions o f the world (“machine”, “mechanism,” 
“equilibrium”) to be only metaphors, while (proportionally) more organistic 
thinkers may have believed their metaphors (“organism”, “organ”, “alive”, 
“growing”) to be factual descriptions (i.e. that the world is “really” a living 
being). For my argument it does not matter much whether the adherent thinks the 
world to be “really” a machine/organism, or only “ similar to” an organism/ 
machine. Once a picture functions as a life-and-world view, it provides a kind o f  
"deeper understanding" o f  the world, a meaning content to our behaviour 
(whether contemplative or active), an “ought”, which induces us to relate to the 
world as if it really “ is” a machine or an organism. Thus the picture itself 
becomes an ultimate reality; a design which is (or pretends to be) simultaneously 
a structuring o f reality.
The two world pictures consciously or unconsciously amount to a designing of 
reality in toto, and therefore to a confusion o f picture (metaphor, subjective 
construct), with reality, in the sense that they function as hermeneutic-heuristic 
outlines for the (re-)construction o f reality. Heidegger (1938:82-83) saw this 
(although limiting his critique to the subjective rationalism o f Modernity), when 
he stated:
W here the world becomes picture, that-which-is in its totality is determined 
as the intended-by-man, which he therefore accordingly wants to bring 
before himself, and have in front o f him, and set before him. World picture 
( Weltbild), essentially understood, therefore does not mean a picture o f the 
world, but the world understood as picture. That-which-is in its totality is 
understood in this context such that it is just and only that-which-is in as far 
as it has been set by the representing, re-establishing human beings. When 
we arrive at a world picture, an essential decision about that-which-is in its 
totality is executed. The being o f that-which-is is sought and found in its 
being-represented (my translation -  JJV; cf. also Venter, 1995:179-190).
Keeping Heidegger in mind, the questioning of the world pictures could be done 
on two counts: firstly on their being constructs o f total reality (i.e. their 
“Archimedean point”-pretence) and secondly on their nonnative (world-viewish) 
social implications. I shall focus on the second, thereby tackling the metaphor 
from the angle o f its constructed reality.
The weakness and strengths o f each o f the two dominant world pictures, as social 
models or standards o f explanation (disciplinary matrices) and behaviour (life- 
views), I hope to open up in the next few pages. I shall take issue with the way in 
which these world pictures, transformed into or functioning as world views, 
construct (social) reality in their own terms, and the ways in which both o f  them 
determine intellectual leadership’s thinking, and function as directive forces 
which cause pain and suffering. Given the fact that such world pictures vacillate 
in their roles from analogies (pictorial descriptions), and standards (models) o f
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reality, to determinants o f thought (paradigms or disciplinary matrices) (cf. 
Santema, 1978:1-26; Botha, 1986:374-383; 1992:78-115) my use o f  terms will 
move among these possibilities, as suits the context. My focus will be on the 
social philosophies suggested by and constructed on the basis o f  these world 
pictures; a theory o f metaphors, models, and/or paradigms is not intended in this 
essay.
2. Organism as societal structure
The organistic world picture suggests a holistic view o f  the internal relation­
ships between entities', i.e. it tends to view individuals as parts o f a larger whole, 
on which they are fully dependent for their life and well-being, in the same way 
that an organ or a member is dependent upon the living body o f which it is a part
-  it cannot be taken out, swopped, or replaced at will. This suggests, therefore, 
that the individual is part o f  smaller social structures, which in turn are parts o f  
larger ones, and  that the larger ones (usually "states"), have rightful 
domination over the sm aller ones. It may even suggest that an elite leadership 
with some special (occult) relationship to the whole, rightfully occupies the 
political power positions. (In such views political and religious power structures 
will tend to support one another.)
On this hypothesis, the conception o f  the material universe as a living being in 
Plato’s Timaeus may provide some explanation o f  his totalitarian views in the 
Republic. Not only does he view the individual in a certain sense as a smaller 
replica o f the state, but he proposes totalitarian control over religion (poetry), 
family life, expression, and social status by a quasi-occult communist elite. He 
tends to view social formations o f a non-state nature (such as economic 
production units, religious institutions, family life, the arts), as simply parts o f the 
political whole, to be subjected to the normative insights of an intellectual elite -  
a view which is still reflected in modem “neo-platonist”, organistic, political 
philosophies like Fichte’s.
•  H obbes -  the state as a civil person
Hobbes provides one o f the most interesting organistic approaches to questions o f 
social structure -  interesting because o f its inconsistency, and its explicit treat­
ment o f  the relationship between “smaller” social institutions and the state as one 
o f “part” versus “whole” . Inconsistently with his mechanistic explanation o f  the 
state o f  nature, Hobbes (1972a: 170) analyses civil society using the organistic 
key metaphors o f  the “general will” and “civil person” :
Now union thus made is called ... a civil person. For when there is one will 
o f all men, it is to be esteemed for one person; and by the word one, it is to 
be known and distinguished from all particular men, as having its own 
rights and properties. Insomuch as neither any one citizen, nor all o f them
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together ... is to be accounted the city. A city therefore ... is one person, 
whose will by the compact of many men, is to be received for the will of 
them all; so as he may use all the power and faculties of each particular 
person to the maintenance of peace, and for common defence.
The change o f metaphors (projected as a change from theory to practice) is not 
innocent. Hobbes wrote the The Citizen earlier than was planned in order to 
influence the debate on “the rights o f dominion and the obedience due from 
subjects”, and to encourage citizens not to disturb the peace o f that institution 
aimed at their preservation (Hobbes, 1972a: 103). He summarily rejected, as 
partial views o f  interest groups, the criticism that he had allocated too much 
power to civil authorities, taken away liberty o f conscience, and set princes above 
the law (Hobbes, 1972a: 105). He proves keen to show that the dictates o f right 
reason, as expressed in the law o f the land, actually express the law o f God, and 
are therefore in harmony with Christianity, thus neutralising the possibility that 
Christians may be more obedient to God than to their government.
The metaphor is elaborated: the supreme power is like the soul, where the will 
has its seat, while the council is like the head (Hobbes, 1972a: 188). Totalitarian 
consequences are drawn from it: other civil persons, like merchant companies, 
are subject to the will o f the city, which is supreme; the laws o f the land provide 
the correct interpretation o f rational religion. The supreme power is above the 
law, absolute, and cannot be dissolved by those who compact it into being. To it 
belongs the sword o f justice, as well as o f war, the legislative power, the 
judicature, the naming o f magistrates, and the censure o f doctrine (Hobbes,
1972a: 173). W hatever Hobbes’s motives may have been: the basic metaphor of 
the state as a single living person, is used as foundational “argument” for an all- 
encompassing and overriding state power.
•  Rousseau: The absolute will of the to ta litarian  sta te
In his Discourse on Political Economy, Jean-Jacques Rousseau used a wide 
repertoire o f metaphors from the organistic world picture in his analysis o f 
government, with the same result as Hobbes. The (living machine) body politic 
has the sovereign as “head”, laws and customs as “brain”, commerce, industry 
and agriculture as “mouth” and “ stomach”, public income as “blood”, economy 
as “heart” and citizens as “body” and “members” . But it is also a moral being, 
possessed o f a (general) will, which is the source o f laws constituting justice (cf. 
Rousseau, 1916a:252-254).
Rousseau anticipates Mussolini’s doctrine that the state makes the people; in 
fact, virtue is nothing more than the conformity o f all particular wills to the 
general will (Rousseau, 1916a:259-260). In virtuous people the heroic passion of 
patriotism has been made subservient to public reason, and the citizens have 
become accustomed to viewing their “individuality only in its relation to the body
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o f the state ... and to be aware o f  their own existence merely as part o f the state” 
(Rousseau, 1916a:268). The state as permanent entity has the right to usurp the 
educational rights o f the transitory institution, the family (Rousseau, 1916a:269), 
as well as to intervene in the economy, with the aim to either maintain or change 
property distribution (Rousseau, 1916a:272-273).
These totalitarian government powers are founded in a totalitarian view o f  the 
sovereign  and the constitution, as described in the Social Contract. M orality is 
founded in law, which implies that the state has the right to uphold morality by 
censorship preventing the com iption o f  public opinion (Rousseau, 1916b, IV, 
vii). Rousseau wanted a (Machiavellian) civil religion based on the model o f 
ancient pagan state religions (continued adherence enforced by the threat o f 
capital punishment), and rejected any claim o f Christianity to fulfil this role, 
supposing it to be a spiritual slave morale which would leave the state without 
defence and divide the loyalty o f the citizen between the priest and the sovereign 
(Rousseau, 1916b, IV, viii). These totalitarian practices are directly related to 
Rousseau’s basic organistic picture o f  the state as Hobbesian persona ficta:
‘Each o f  us puts his person and all his power in common under the supreme 
direction o f  the general will, and, in our corporate capacity, we receive each 
member as an invisible part o f the whole.’ At once, in place o f  the 
individual personality o f  each contracting party, this act o f  association 
creates a moral and collective body, composed o f  as many members as the 
assembly contains votes, and receiving from this act its unity, its common 
identity, its life and its will (Rousseau, 1916b: 15).
Since the Enlightenment, firstly, reality became focused in man (man as the telos 
o f  the universe, according to Kant) and reality and history became one. A living 
universe in this case is a homo-centric universe. Secondly, since ancient times, 
the organistic world picture showed a tendency towards pantheism (even in quasi- 
theistic philosophical systems like Neo-Platonism). This was associated with 
magic: everything being alive usually meant everything being “ spiritual” and 
“divine” or “demonic” to some degree. Gradations o f  spirituality implied a 
hierarchy, which, on a social level, leads to elitism, whether o f a religious 
(esoteric), political (aristocratic) or gender (chauvinistic) nature. This whole 
cluster o f ideas around the organistic picture can serve to (at least partially) 
explain the defence o f  totalitarian and authoritarian regimes in the twentieth 
century.
•  O rgan istic  holism in Fascism  and Nazism
Mussolini (1935:7-8), interpreting Bergson’s organistic approach, stressed that 
the conception o f the state as a philosophy o f life is directly associated with an 
organic conception o f the world. The state is “divine”, spiritual, transcends space 
and time, is universal, national, permanent and moral. The materially physical is
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individual, transitory, subject to natural law, ego-centric, short-lived. Life finds 
its true expression only in the state, which is conscience, consciousness and 
general will together -  it creates the nation (Mussolini, 1935:9-12). Thus the 
fascist state assumes full control o f the heart o f the citizen:
Fascism, in short, is not a law-giver and a founder o f institutions, but an 
educator and a promoter o f spiritual life. It aims at refashioning not only 
the forms o f life but their content -  man, his character, and his faith. To 
achieve this purpose it enforces discipline and uses authority, entering into 
the soul and ruling with undisputed sway (Mussolini, 1935:14).
D.H. Lawrence shares both the world picture and its widest consequences with 
Mussolini. Mysticism, occultism, elitism, racism, ethnicism are all expressions of 
his organistic pantheism in the novel, The Plumed Serpent. Aristocratic man, 
rooted in the living motherly earth and the fatherly, invisible, black sun behind the 
yellow sun, is here projected as divine ruler o f his fellow human beings -  he 
combines spiritualist mysticism with a “blood-and-soil” ideology (cf. further 
Venter, 1996:17fF). Attention may also be drawn to the theosophic origins of 
German Nazism -  showing the same basic tendencies -  for example in the 
thought o f Lanz (who is supposed to have influenced Hitler; cf. Tresmontant, 
1991:68 ff). The broad outlines o f these ideologies are summarised as follows by 
Stemhell (note the organistic base):
The essential element here is the linking o f  the human soul with its natural 
surroundings, with the ‘essence’ o f nature, that the real and important truths 
are to be found beneath surface appearances. According to many Volkisch 
theorists, the nature o f the soul o f the Volk is determined by the nature o f  
the landscape. Thus, the Jews, being a desert people, are regarded as 
shallow and dry people, devoid o f profundity and totally lacking in 
creativity ... The self-same themes are to be met in the nationalist ideology 
o f France: the Frenchman, nurtured by his soil and his dead, cannot escape 
the destiny shaped for him by past generations, by the landscapes o f his 
childhood, the blood o f his forebears. The nation is a living organism, and 
nationalism is therefore an ethic, comprising all the criteria o f behaviour 
which the common interest calls for, and on which the will o f the individual 
has no bearing. The duty o f the individual and of society is to find out what 
this ethic may be, yet only those can succeed who have a share in the 
‘national consciousness’ ...(Stem hell, 1979:337-338; italics mine -  JJV).
Heidegger’s sympathies with Nazism was probably also based on a shared world 
picture. In his attempt to develop a pre-Christian philosophy, he embarked on a 
“neo-platonist” search for the primitive ground o f being, which finds expression 
in authentic existence. This search excluded the idea of a transcendent creator 
god from his seminarian days (cf. Tresmontant, 1991:460 ff). Thus all being can 
be conceived of as saturated with the “divine” ground, which may be subject to
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forgetfulness, and therefore imposes the calling to search for it while “ remaining” 
where you “are” . In his later works he identifies “essence” or “ identity”, 
expressed in language, as this “ground”-language being the archaic word which 
unifies the world quatemity: heaven versus earth  and divine versus mortal. The 
physical aspect (sound, mouth, body) o f  the expression o f the archaic word 
through man, is not conceived o f in terms o f  the meaning-sound-dualism, but is 
considered as essential component o f  language, through which we are bound to 
region and earth:
In the tongue (dialect) every different landscape and therefore the earth 
speaks. The mouth is not simply a kind o f  organ in the body represented as 
organism, but body and mouth belong in the stream and growth o f  the 
earth, in which we, the mortals, flourish, from which we receive the 
thoroughness o f  a rootedness in soil. Together with the earth we also 
certainly loose the rootedness in soil (Heidegger, 1959:205; my translation 
and italics -  JJV).
South African Afrikaner leaders, such as H.F. Verwoerd (murdered prime 
minister and “architect” o f  apartheid), N. Diederichs (former minister o f  finance 
and state president), P.J. M eyer (who headed the S.A. Broadcasting Corporation), 
and some others who became influential professors in the social sciences in 
Afrikaans universities, studied in Germany in the Weimar era, where they 
imbibed the organistic pantheism o f German nationalism (philosophically rooted 
in Fichte, Herder, Schelling and even Boehme), and developed social theories in 
which the ethnic nation (“volk”) is exalted as the organic unit through which 
institutions and individuals become human and receive their meaning (Morphew, 
1989:63-80). The dispensation which they had in mind for South Africa followed 
this basic tenet to its ultimate consequences: every ethnic nation had to have its 
own piece o f land, governed by its own people and its own institutions, which 
could only thrive within the ambit o f such nationhood. This was the basis for the 
establishment o f ethnic universities, schools, the prevention o f  mixed marriages, 
the homelands, et cetera. “Volk” and state more or less coincided, and 
totalitarian “volk” became totalitarian state.
•  T hem atic sim ilarities am ong the tw entieth century authors
Twentieth century authors tend to relate human beings to one another in terms 
o f  organically conceived social institutions such as the "nation ", the "state ", et 
cetera. In this respect they do continue the basic approaches o f H obbes’s and 
Rousseau’s organistic metaphorising o f the social scene, and the totalitarian 
consequences are undeniable. Twentieth century authors, however, go further, or 
rather, tend to revive ancient mythological modes o f  thought ', the rootedness in a 
motherly earth, the blood-and-spiritual bond with the forebears, the elitism based 
in the “occult” capabilities o f the aristocracy, are all reminiscent, not only o f
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Greek organistic thinking, but also o f pre-Hellenic Egyptian and Babylonian 
“political” theogonies.
3 . I n d iv id u a ls  a s  m a c h in e  p a r ts
The mechanistic world picture initially served to explain the dynamics o f the 
physical universe on the basis o f a cultural product, the automaton. Very soon, 
however, the picture was transferred to other areas: first, to explain physiological 
processes, and later also social processes (cf. Venter, 1992a:191-198).
•  T he au tom aton: independence of the p a r t  from  the whole
The mechanistic world picture significantly differs from the organistic one in its 
suggestions with regard to the part-whole-relationship: the parts o f a machine can 
(with relative ease) be removed, repaired, replaced, or used as spare parts for 
other machines. It thus suggests a relative independence o f the part from the 
whole (compared to an organ or member in the organistic picture), and an 
aggregational view o f the whole, especially when it concerns social institutions. 
God can be (“Christianly”) viewed as both engineer and mechanic, or 
(deistically) as only the engineer (leaving the “automaton” to its own autonomous 
contrivances).
•  T he new tonian m etaphor of g rav itational equilibrium
After the initial metaphor, that o f the clock had (in discussions o f social 
problematic) been replaced by the newtonian one o f  gravitational equilibrium, a 
process-feature could be introduced into the picture: “machines” could now be 
seen as aggregations o f equilibrating (and disequilibrating) forces. This disclosed 
important possibilities for the historicising o f reality and the body politic in the 
eighteenth century: one could resist the idea o f the nanny-state, assuming 
autonomous individual citizens, each taking care o f his own interest, while the 
aggregation still functions according to strict natural laws o f progress by virtue of 
equilibrating competition.
•  H obbes: A m echanistic dissolving of the whole into its generative p a rts  -  
the w atch  m etaphor
Hobbes (1588-1679) was too early to profit from a metaphorising o f  Newton’s 
(1642-1727) theory o f gravitation (published 1687) for his mechanistic 
explanation o f the state o f nature. In spite o f  his organistic picture o f  the civil 
state, his conclusions about the state o f nature are the results o f an analysis o f the 
civil state as an existing whole, viewed as a “watch or some such small engine” to 
be taken apart (and not o f an empirical study o f the natural conditions; cf. 
Hobbes, 1972a:99). This discrepancy can probably be explained by his motive of 
instilling obedience in rebellious citizens by providing scientifically indisputable 
arguments proving (a priori, cf. Venter, 1994:37-41) the horrors o f living in a
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state o f nature in comparison to the security provided by the civil state (cf. 
Hobbes, 1972b:41-42).
This mechanistic (metaphorical) dissolving o f the whole into its generative 
constituent parts, produces a picture o f the state o f nature in which individuals 
(equal in right to everything), following their (conflicting) appetites (rather than 
reason), as well as striving for self-preservation, are in constant competition or 
conflict with one another. But these premises also necessarily imply that such 
individuals will move into a civil state by contract aimed at self-preservation 
through the formation o f  alliances (Hobbes, 1972a: 115-118). The compact being 
made, a living being, the body politic, comes into being, and all the totalitarian 
consequences sketched above become operative. The alternative, therefore, is: 
either bellum omnium contra omnes, or a totalitarian and authoritarian security 
state. The first disjunct is supposed to eliminate itself, but can reappear if  citizens 
become disobedient.
Bernard Mandeville transformed civil society itself into the Hobbesian state of 
nature, suggesting that society flourishes as a result o f  egoism (including crime), 
and that intervention, even in the form o f  charitable schooling o f  children, would 
be detrimental to its well-being.
•  A dam  Sm ith: the equilibrium  m etaphor and the huma n  m ind, m oral life 
and econom ic processes -  the m ark e t m etapho r
It was probably Adam Smith who first saw the applicability o f  the equilibrium 
metaphor to the human mind (1980), moral life (1976), and economic processes 
(1950). Both Adam Smith and Immanuel Kant shuttle between the organistic and 
the mechanistic world pictures. They cannot afford to finally let go o f  the former: 
they share the Enlightenment faith in progress, and therefore presuppose a 
homocentric teleology o f  nature, working in and through man, and using as its 
instrument the supposedly mechanical process o f  competition am ongst 
individuals and  groups. This aspect becomes the dominant one, for “G od’s” 
teleology can only be approached through the analysis o f human efficient 
causality -  taken here in a fairly literal mechanical sense.
Smith views all social relationships in terms o f the market as model or standard. 
This presupposes that the individual human being naturally relates to others in a 
contractual (bartering) way:
Society may subsist among men, as among different merchants, from a 
sense o f its utility, without any mutual love and affection; and though no 
man in it be bound in gratitude to any other, it may still be upheld by a 
mercenary exchange o f  good offices according to an agreed valuation 
(Smith, 1976:86).
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But such an utility-based social order is “futuristic” in Smith’s view, since utility 
is only recognised by a mature, rational humanity. For the time being mankind is 
still in the emulation phase, in which the passion for out-shining others is 
dominant (Smith, 1976:16, 41 fT, 114fF, 145fF). But even in the passionate 
emulation phase, progress is served by self-interest, “intuited” by the 
(hedonistically conceived) sense o f agreeability or disagreeableness. In the face 
o f Hutcheson’s rejection and Mandeville’s cynical acceptance o f self-interest, 
Smith elevates it to the motor o f welfare, at a level midrange between the social 
and the unsocial passions. Self-interest is moderated by the judgment o f the 
impartial spectator -  a proto-freudian internal, supposedly objective super-ego, 
which executes judgement under the guidance o f  agreeability, according to the 
rules o f  prudence (longterm self-interest) and justice (social interest). In this way 
Smith hopes to avoid conventionalism (accepting that the individual becomes a 
moral creature only through society), as well as arbitrary, individualistic 
sentimentalism (Smith, 1976:130-150).
In the context o f economics, Smith determines the basis o f self-interest by the 
Enlightenment historiographical method o f retrospective extrapolation (based on 
the law o f progress) -  extrapolating to what man “originally” (or “naturally”) is: 
a farming barterer who owns the full product o f his labour. The amount o f labour 
time invested in a product will therefore form the basis o f bartering negotiations; 
historical developments add the rent price of land and the profits o f stock to this 
base (Smith, 1976:49-50). Individuals therefore (in an “original” sense) take care 
o f their own interests in terms of the value o f their labour, and this provides the 
equilibrating forces which will move the market price in the direction o f the 
“natural” (equilibrium) price:
The natural price, therefore, is, as it were, the central price, to which the 
prices o f commodities are continually gravitating. Different accidents may 
sometimes keep them suspended a good deal above it, and sometimes force 
them down even somewhat below it. But whatever may be the obstacles 
which hinder them from settling in this centre o f  repose and continuance, 
they are constantly tending towards it (Smith, 1950:60; my italics -  JJV).
Smith is as much a contractualist as Hobbes and Rousseau; yet his view of 
society as a totality differs radically from theirs: the market metaphor -  for him 
probably more than a metaphor -  implies that society is a process o f  continuously 
contracting individuals', the state is relegated to the status o f a protective 
framework for this process.
•  K ant: history  is sub ject to m cchanical, causal laws -  the autom aton
Kant (1975a) uses metaphors reminiscent o f those of Adam Smith in his analysis 
o f  historical social formations under the guidance o f the teleology o f nature. 
Using the same retrospective extrapolation method, he uncovers the development
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of reason as freedom in the individual (cf. also Venter, 1992b:33-38), which 
practically means a quasi-Hobbesian natural state o f unsociability (Kant, 
1975b:38-40). Conflict and competition are, as in Hobbes, the forces which 
necessitate the establishment o f communities, and, in the end, o f a world 
community or league o f nations in which rationality and eternal peace would 
reign. Kant’s view o f  social history is an explicit formulation o f the doctrine o f  
the balance o f  power, starting with autonomous individuals, tlirough smaller 
communities and national states, to end up with the league o f  nations:
All wars are, therefore, so many attempts (truly not in the intentions o f  the 
people but in those o f  nature), to establish new relationships among states ... 
until in the end, in part by the structuring o f the best possible legal order, in 
part by communal external agreement and legislation, a situation is 
established which maintains itself analogously to civil society, just like an 
automaton. The barbarous freedom o f  the already established states ... 
necessitates that our species find, in addition to the in itself salutary 
resistance o f  many states, a law o f equilibrium ... (Kant, 1975b:44).
“Automaton” here takes the function o f a model (a pictorial standard); but then a 
strongly representative model, intended to express a (for Kant) undeniable reality. 
history is subject to mechanical, causal laws.
The views regarding society o f Malthus, Ricardo, and Darwin follow the same 
metaphorical pattern, based on the same mechanistic picture o f the world (cf. 
Venter, 1994:5-16), stressing the “autonomy” o f the “parts” -  individuals or 
smaller groups, which, through competitive activities, act as motor forces of 
history.
•  D arw in ’s m etaphor of n a tu ra l selection
Darwin transferred the competition-equilibrium matrix, implied in the metaphor o f 
“natural selection” (and he explicitly acknowledges it to be a metaphor), to the 
study o f  nature (in The Origin o f  Species [1968] cf. Young, 1988; Venter, 1996: 
13ff). He also used this metaphor in a normative sense, as a policy proposal 
regarding human population development, opposing family planning schemes, so 
as to ensure the continued progress o f mankind through the competition of 
individuals. For the moral and legal sphere, however, he moderated the demands 
o f  health and vigour in the individual (vis-a-vis social well-being), by 
presupposing another equilibrating process: that between altruistic and ego­
centric instincts (cf. Darwin, 1906:194, 945-946). He thus avoids the “ social 
Darwinist” consequence o f  summarily characterizing the competitively successful 
.as the “civilized”, “hard-working”, or “morally good” (as was done by Sumner, 
1934, and others.)
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One should not summarily conclude that all o f these thinkers were in fact 
insensitive to the “immoral” and/or “ sociopath” implications o f the egocentric 
individualism they were preaching. They rather trusted the automatism o f  the 
equilibrium process to take care o f  the interests o f  “justice", "sobriety", 
"honesty ” on the basis o f  real “merit
•  T he m arket m etaphor as the basic m etaphor for the social sciences
Equilibrium theorists, such as the New Classical and the Monetarist economists 
o f the past few decades, seem to put their trust exactly in this same automatic 
fairness and warranted morality o f the “market” mechanism -  on condition that 
we, like Adam Smith -  accept the market metaphor as the basic explanatory or 
predictive metaphor fo r  the social sciences.
To keep the competition-equilibrium structure workable as a standard approach 
(disciplinary matrix) which is supposed to provide economists with predictive 
laws, some very “unrealistic” assumptions had to be made, such as the 
availability o f perfect information (on costs, tastes, alternatives, for both 
producers and consumers), perfect competition, a perfect market. As 
irrationalism grew and the organistic picture regained some foothold, these 
assumptions have been challenged in different ways. In Keynesian economics 
uncertainty plays a pivotal role, and therefore the expectation o f equilibrium 
becomes problematic (although Keynes still attempts to use it; cf. Keynes, 1936; 
Torr, 1988:39-50). And according to Von Hayek the assumptions express no 
more than the a priori possibilities open to an individual in the market; it 
provides no analysis o f real competition processes, which are clouded by 
uncertainty, and at most, tend to co-ordinate the economic and social actions of 
individuals. Von Hayek, however, retains the market metaphor for all o f  society 
in terms o f a “methodological” (not: ontological) individualism, according to 
which the market functions as a hermeneutical process (cf. Von Hayek, 1949:33­
54; 93 ff; Venter, 1996:27fi).
•  M onetarism
These innovations have not totally eliminated the competition-equilibrium matrix 
from the realm o f economics. In New Classical economics and in Monetarism 
(both high profile schools which have influenced policy making very strongly), it 
still holds sway. There are claims that are also applicable in -  and in fact the best 
approach for -  other social disciplines.
In Friedman’s version o f Monetarism, general equilibrium analysis is partitioned 
into different analyses o f specific problems, while the New Classicals tend to 
believe that everything depends on everything, and that therefore the partitioning 
o f problems is invalid. They share, however, the basic tenets that economic 
agents are, to the limits o f their information, consistent and successful optimizers
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(that they make most o f their opportunities and are therefore in equilibrium); and 
that agents hold rational expectations (i.e. they make no systematic errors in 
evaluating the economic environment; Hoover, 1988:182-193). These tenets 
express the classical competition-equilibrium matrix in an irrationalist context: 
individuals act optimally for their own benefit, and what they do expect is what 
they should expect. In the New Classical school the automatism is so strong that 
institutional analysis o f even the business enterprise itself is rejected in favour of 
treating it as a blackbox causal link between the actions o f  individuals and price 
changes (Machlup, 1967:9).
Importantly, in the Monetarist case, the validity o f  these tenets is not limited to 
economics. The Monetarist, Karl Brunner, explicitly rejects a multidisciplinary 
approach to economic problems (including, as he calls it, the Keynesian 
“sociological perceptions o f non-market situations”), and wants to apply the basic 
principles o f Monetarism to other social disciplines, as if economics provides the 
only valid social scientific approach (Klamer, 1985:183):
We reject, on the other hand, an escape into sociology which offers no 
relevant analytic framework. We maintain that socio-political institutions 
are the proper subject o f  economic analysis. This entails an entirely 
different view o f  the political institutions and their operation. The 
sociological view typically supports a goodwill theory o f government and 
yields conclusions favouring a large and essentially unlimited government.
An application o f  economic analysis, in contrast, alerts us to the fact that 
politicians and bureaucrats are entrepreneurs in the political market. They 
pursue their own interests and try to find optimal strategies attending to 
their interests. And what is optimal for them is hardly ever optimal for 
‘public interest’ (Brunner in: Klamer, 1985:186).
•  F riedm an : Political m arkets versus econom ic m arkets
Friedman provides us with a simple exemplary analysis o f  political markets 
versus economic markets, in an attempt to show that the political market is 
actually a less efficient system o f coordinating individual self-interest, which will 
take away our individual freedoms, the more we put our trust in it. According to 
him the accepted distinction between the economic market as aimed at self­
interest and the political system as directed at public interest, is a myth -  the latter 
actually only serves the self-interest o f the public servant (to be human, is to 
pursue self-interest). Secondly, exchange in the political market does not take 
place on the basis o f  “one man one vote”, for it actually functions on the basis o f 
weighted votes o f  small interest groups, which determine a whole package to be 
voted for on a “yes/no” basis, whereas the economic market provides for a much 
freer and more equitable proportional voting system (“one man one dollar”), in 
which you get what you vote for (voting for every item separately). The essence
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of a political arrangement is coercion; that o f a market arrangement is voluntary 
co-operation between people (cf. Friedman, 1976:6 fi).
Friedman (1976:11 ff) views the equilibrating forces as moving parallel to 
another: if government spending increases on the insistence o f the electorate, 
without taxes increasing too (i.e. money is created ahead o f  production), then this 
is balanced by a hidden tax increase called inflation. Increased government 
spending is also accompanied by increased government controls and security 
provisions o f all kinds, which is balanced by decreasing efficiency and freedom 
and increasing collectivism (Friedman, 1976). Friedman is prepared to invert this 
causal chain: any increase o f private, free enterprise, capitalism is accompanied 
by an increase in political freedom -  in fact, individualistic free enterprise 
capitalism is a sine qua non for a free political system. Even social welfare in its 
broadest sense (“eleemosynary activity” -  the establishment o f non-profit 
institutions like universities, libraries, hospitals, et cetera) flourish during periods 
o f  decreasing government controls and increasing free enterprise, Friedman 
jubilates, on the basis o f what he sees as the results o f 19th century laissez-faire 
policies (Friedman, 1976:25 ff). Although Friedman seems to provide us with a 
strictly “positive” (rather than a “nonnative”) analysis o f the economic-social 
reality, his analysis is clearly aimed at promoting “freedom”, and is therefore 
normative in spite o f its pretences.
These parallels show the grip which mechanistic thinking has on Friedman. Von 
Hayek (1949:30), as anti-collectivistic as Friedman can ever be, but rejecting 
such a purely mechanistic approach, could not find an automatic correlation 
between individual freedom and social equity; in fact, he accepts a trade-off 
between the two as unavoidable (cf. also Venter, 1996:39).
Initially, the mechanistic picture functioned as a methodological directive, by 
which the handling o f the “organs” of Hobbes’s social organism was legitimized, 
just as if they were “ independent” machine parts. This approach gave a kind of 
"autonomy " and  mutual antagonism to the “parts  ”, which was individualistic, at 
least in consequence. Gravitation theory disclosed the possibility o f  a process­
like approach within the mechanistic picture, by which historical progress 
(including the automatic establishment o f justice and morality) could be modelled, 
on the supposition o f individuals in competition, given disequilibratingforces to 
prevent stagnation. In spite o f the collapse o f  the faith in progress, and in spite 
o f criticism o f equilibrium theories, the disciplinary matrix o f self-interested 
individuals who create economic welfare as well as social welfare (and justice) 
through an equilibrating “market mechanism” , remains very strong indeed. In this 
tradition scant attention is given to the structures and functions o f  different social 
institutions such as the business enterprise, the state, the family -  its analytical
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toolshed makes do with terms like “individual”, “competition”, “ self-interest”, 
“market”, “buy/sell”, “equilibrium” .
Ironically, the deterministic general equilibrium approaches have been criticized 
for eliminating real competitiveness from their theory. As the representations o f 
the competition-equilibrium matrix became more overtly mechanistic (especially 
as a consequence o f  the “perfect”-assumptions), its power to explain or describe 
the economic and/or social processes, qua processes, decreased. Under such 
theoretical ideal conditions as represented under the “perfect”-assumptions, the 
balance o f powers is immediate or permanent (or, more technically, takes place in 
mathematical time rather than Bergsonian durée), while in reality, “to compete” 
involves surprise, novelty, innovation, and even dissembling over time (cf. 
Addleson, 1988:462-463).
•  P rincip le o f  com petitiveness w ell established in W estern  culture
It is, however, noteworthy that the principle o f competitiveness has been well 
established in Western culture, also in the analysis o f  social processes. 
Competitive individualism has been transferred to competitive nationalism, and it 
seems as if  competition is no more simply a means, as in the eighteenth century, 
but rather something like a norm or an end. The “winning nations” are to be 
taken as norm by the “losers” in the Third World; the GATT agreement opens up 
“free trade” all over the world; “competitiveness” is the supposed answer for a 
country’s industries; at school, winning, whether in sports or in intellectual 
pursuits, counts, and coming second almost does not; “publish or perish” in the 
academic world is only an expression o f the competition motive as norm and does 
not necessary road to “quality” or “excellence” .
It is not all that rosy however: countries are flooding each other’s markets with 
more or less the same products; Third World countries are forced to compete on 
an unequal footing with First World countries, and become more and more 
indebted to them; the accentuation o f  individual and particular interests tends to 
strengthen selfishness, and can be detrimental to creativity; human lives are 
losing their value as self-interest in the context o f  a collapse o f  values turns into 
outright egoism.
4. Perspective: Is there a way out?
The organistic world picture promotes a “whole” versus “part” approach in the 
analysis o f social structures and processes. The interests o f the “whole” take 
precedence over those o f the “parts”, i.e. organistic thinking implies “holism” . It 
is not clear which criteria are used to identify important “wholes” (usually states, 
tribes, or ethnic groups or even “ society”) -  it seems as if cultural, racial, power, 
and geographical considerations are taken into account without much critical
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investigation. W hatever differences there may be between “parts” and their 
“whole” are easily forgotten as smaller institutions are usurped by the interests of 
larger or stronger ones. The consequences are not only almost complete control 
over the lives o f individuals, but also o f associations which differ in their primary 
aims (or functions) from the primary aims (or functions) o f the “whole” . This is 
totalitarianism. It can be o f a “majoritarian” orientation (like that o f Rousseau), 
or more authoritarian, as in Fascist or Nazi elitism -  neither has any patience with 
religious, educational, artistic, sports, or other institutions viewing their roles as 
different from the aim o f the “whole” .
The mechanistic picture rejects dominance by a supposed social “whole” . 
M echanists tend to view the encompassing, powerful institutions as aggregations 
o f individuals -  a suggestion inherent in the relative independence of a machine 
part from its machine whole. This view made it possible to combine individual 
autonomy with a deterministic view o f historical progress, in which justice, peace 
and moral decency could all be seen as the equilibrium product o f the opposing 
“gravitational” forces of self-interest. This world picture allows for much 
patience with the role difference o f smaller and less powerful associational forms, 
and wishes to reduce the powers and functions of the strongest one, the state. It 
assumes, however, a market totalitarianism, and trusts the “market” (i.e. the 
competition-equilibrium matrix) to solve the problems o f justice, morality, peace, 
and social welfare. Efficiently successful “trading” is supposed to (always) leave 
the barterers better off than before! This trust discloses the capitalist values 
hidden behind the mechanistic metaphors and analytical patterns. Although 
economistic in its orientation, its analytical approach obstructs any sense of 
institutional differentation. It is therefore unable to get a clear picture o f the 
ethical role o f the family, or the primarily justitial aims o f the state, vis-a-vis the 
profit aims o f the business enterprise. Thus all other institutions become 
progressively disempowered with regard to self-interest as such, and egoism 
becomes the norm.
•  C an any liberating m ediation betw een the two world view s be effected  ?
It can indeed be asked whether there is a way out o f this impasse; whether 
mediation between the two world views can be effected. Another issue is 
whether these world views possibly include some valuable elements which could 
direct us in a direction away from both of them?
The organistic picture seems to recognise the different functions o f different 
social institutions, but sublimates these into the aims and interests o f the whole. 
The adherents o f the mechanistic picture try to avoid the totalitarianism and 
authoritarianism which we have found associated with the organistic approach, 
and allow for much more freedom of the individual members o f “society” (and as 
a result o f this, for the freedom o f weaker institutions). Yet the latter is no more
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able than the organists to clearly outline the pluriformity o f social relationships, 
and allow for the freedom o f their functioning as social unities, for it represents 
“society” as a number o f  configurations o f forces (where self-interest is the real 
motor force), neglecting the question o f “power” inequalities behind the forces, as 
well as the differences in social context in which these “forces” operate.
•  P ictures as norm s: integrationism  versus isolationism
Furthermore, once any (single) picture is used to explain all o f  reality and to give 
meaning to life (i.e. when a world picture is transformed into a world view, 
regardless o f whether it functions for its author in a “real” or in a “metaphorical” 
sense), it fulfils both a “factual” and “normative” role -  in other words it 
encompasses both an “ is” and an “ought” . In the present case this means that for 
both pictures the world (which includes human social life) both is (similar to) an 
organism or a machine, and ought to be treated as (similar to) an organism or a 
machine.
Thus the organistic world view is holistic both in a factual and in a normative 
sense. It contends that individuals and smaller institutions are (similar to) the 
organs o f an organic whole, and that it is wrong or evil for us human beings not to 
live up to cur “part”-playing as “organs” o f  the “organism” . It cannot but react 
negatively (crying “ sedition”, “treason” , “disloyalty”) in response to any claims 
that a smaller/weaker social institution (say a school), might opt to follow aims 
differing from those o f  “ society” (which, nowadays, is equated with the state, or 
the “nation”). Especially nationalist political authorities are unreasonable in their 
demands that all institutions fall in line with “national” aims. Churches, sporting 
bodies, academic associations, need not, however, for example, limit their 
spheres o f  influence to national boundaries. In terms o f its normative im­
plications, the organistic world view tends to (enforced) integrationism.
Equally, the mechanistic world view zigzags between “ is” and “ought” . The 
representation o f  the world as (similar to) a machine/automat incorporates a 
characteristic o f modem technology: the abstraction from a specific solution o f  a 
specific problem by using “neutral” modular components which (though limited 
by the purpose o f  the particular machine), still have “a certain artificial 
independence” (Schuurman, 1980:15). Thus society is represented as consisting 
factually o f an aggregate o f  (self-interested) forces; this is dialectically switched 
into promoting self-interest as the basic norm for all social functioning. In 
contrast (and sometimes clearly in reaction) to organistic holism, it takes an 
isolationist stance, promoting a “private sector”, individualistic approach with a 
strong economistic slant to it. There is some recognition o f  the right to freedom 
o f non-state institutions, but no thoroughgoing analysis o f their different 
institutional functions seems to emerge after the fragmentation o f “ society” into 
neutral machine components.
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Von Hayek recognized something valuable in both pictures. He carefully and 
qualifiedly borrowed metaphors from the organistic approach, given its sensitivity 
for structural unity. But he also appreciated the openness for freedom and the 
anticollectivism o f the mechanistic approach, and held onto this in the form o f a 
so-called “methodological individualism” (Venter, 1996:236).
•  Institutional plurality
To avoid imitating Von Hayek’s awkward ride on two horses parting ways, we 
should first enquire whether the two world pictures really cover the whole field of 
experience, as they pretend to, and whether they really (in “principle”) form 
alternatives to be expressed in an exclusive disjunction. This difficulty is 
probably rooted in the fact that the two pictures have become world views -  their 
limitations as only metaphors have been forgotten, and they acquired authority 
beyond their legitimate applicability.
One can, o f course, model many aspects o f “reality” in terms o f mechanical 
metaphors (for example) the movement o f limbs in a body. The very existence of 
organic chemistry and biochemistry tells us, however, that such metaphorising 
must have limitations. In the same way we can use biotic metaphors to express 
ourselves about non-biotic matters, such as the “growth” o f the money supply, yet 
realizing that the applicability o f this metaphor is limited by the fact that human 
beings make decisions about the increase in the quantity o f money (which is 
clearly not the case with the growth o f an organism). Similarly one can also draw 
metaphors from other fields o f experience. Darwin’s metaphor o f (natural) 
“ selection” (by his own admission) was drawn from human culture (the selection 
practices o f  breeders); he had to supplement its lack o f a selection agent by 
metaphorising “competition” into a natural process (an approach ridiculed by 
Marx as transferring the British economy into nature). Thomas Kuhn (1975) used 
the metaphor of “conversion” from the area o f religion, to describe the social 
behaviour o f the adherents o f a “paradigm” (another metaphor probably drawn 
from grammar).
•  O ne single m etaphor cannot explain the interrelationships o f  all entities
The plurality o f possible metaphors themselves point to something beyond 
language -  the plurality o f possible relationships between human beings and 
whatever is in their environment. Surely the relationship between husband and 
wife differs from their relationships to their expected baby, and this again differs 
from that o f the family doctor towards the embryo. Society has long ago 
recognized this difference, and therefore set limitations on the medical 
involvement o f doctors with their own family members. And doesn’t the relation­
ship o f the sculptor toward a piece of marble differ from that o f the person who 
sells it to him? O f course one can attempt to reduce both the latter relationships 
to their physico-chemical properties, but as Von Hayek has so clearly shown, one
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will then be unable to make any specific sense o f these relationships, or o f any 
other cultural activity (Von Hayek, 1952:17fT; Venter, 1996:23Iff). Every 
human entity, from the moment o f conception, exists in such a plurality o f 
relationships -  the Hobbesian state o f nature as a state o f isolated individuals was 
the product o f abstractive projection (as recognised by Hobbes himself, but 
forgotten by Rousseau).
The differences among these relationships disclose the possibility that they may 
be structured into different institutional forms. A group o f people playing football 
may found a club as an institutional form. The club will need capital assets (such 
as a playing field); has to establish itself as a “ legal person” ; will need an 
administrative executive (chairman, secretary, etc.) as well as a team leadership 
(captain; vice-captain), and a trainer. A drama reading group, on the other hand, 
can get along by using a member’s living room and kitchen facilities, taking turns 
to organize meetings, but cannot get along without some intellectually developed 
minds. A state needs elaborate mechanisms for the protection o f  its citizens’ 
rights; a school only an organized teaching staff, children who want to learn, and 
a minimum of administrative and physical infrastructure.
Once a single metaphor is used to explain the functioning and interrelationships of 
all entities, sensitivity for the differences among social relationships as well as the 
peculiar forms of institutionalizing which they may assume, is lost. W hether 
intended as “reality” or as “only metaphor”, both the mechanistic and the 
organistic world views are reductionistic in their representations o f social reality -  
a reductionism which has worrying nonnative implications (as I attempted to 
show above). The social modelling o f the two world pictures provide normative 
models which tend to cover the whole area o f social life, in all its forms. The 
mechanistic one tends to reduce all social forms to that one o f which the 
supposed analogy with a machine was first perceived -  inter-individual 
competition (of which the market remains as the ideal type). The organistic one 
subjects all social forms to the interests and power o f the one perceived to be the 
most encompassing, and model them according to the relationship o f  an organism 
to its organs.
•  Swop the roles and see what happens
The secret, probably, is to find a theoretical way of limiting the expansion o f such 
metaphors. One way of going about this could be a kind o f deconstructive 
behaviour-swopping procedure, in which the institutional hierarchy within the 
ambit o f the metaphor is inverted.
In the ambit o f the organistic metaphor the state or the nation (and its aims) tends 
to have the upper hand; thus we can limit this metaphor by swopping state 
behaviour with that o f a less powerful institution (such as a high school). In the
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ambit o f the mechanistic metaphor, the market dominates: we can thus apply the 
normal behaviour o f (say) a married couple to a market situation, and vice versa.
* Imagine organizing a school primarily according to the principles o f law and 
order using a military mode o f training, the youngsters carrying arms and 
doing the drill, organizing themselves into political parties struggling to gain 
the upper hand; the principal and staff being elected by the children according 
to the principles o f multi-party democracy. Will this provide for a balanced 
process o f enculturation, which schools normally stand for? Need I stretch the 
imagination to include the possibility of such a school becoming a mini-state in 
a neighbourhood? (For some South-Africans this may be a nightmarish 
reminder o f recent historical reality.) Imagine establishing a state in con­
formity with the normal educational principles o f a high school, treating all 
citizens as schoolboys and girls; the head-of-state following the decision­
making processes, awards and punishments o f school principals; the cabinet 
handling the electorate as so many classrooms full o f schoolgoing children.
* Imagine a marital relationship constructed on the basis o f Adam Smith’s 
exchange o f  good offices rather than benevolence:
Hubby: “Honey, like a w ine’n dine tonight?” Honey: “O ’course, but what 
d ’ye have in mind?” Hubby: “Oh, nothing much ... a quiet little place like 
Spartacus’s Greek Cuisine; they have nice smalls, you know; good food; 
nice music ...” Honey: “1 didn’t mean that. I mean what returns do you 
hope to get from your investment?” Hubby: “Not much this time, you 
know ...” Honey: “OK! you may touch my knees; but you know I get a 
headache if  you go any higher.” Hubby: “Well! If you get that headache 
tonight, I still have the option of popping in at Clare’s. She doesn’t get 
headaches!” Honey: “Do you want me to wear that dress with the thigh- 
high slit?” Hubby: “Now w e’re getting somewhere. Competition always 
produces quality, whether service or product ...” (Do we need to construct 
an example o f a buyer treating a shop assistant in the way spouses relate to 
one another?)
The examples may be ridiculously trivial, yet they illustrate the point: stretching 
their social implications to the limits by deconstructive behaviour-swopping, 
highlights the strange consequences of these reductionist normative metaphors.
* The pain/suffering indicator
A second, more serious and less trivialising approach to limit the dangerous 
consequences o f misleading “is-ought” metaphors through the bridging of the “is- 
ought” gap, can be found in the pain/suffering indicator. The interplay between 
“is” and “ought” in the two metaphors has already been noted. Accepting that 
the direct move from “ is” to “ought” is invalid, it can still be argued that an 
indirect movement is possible -  via the pain/suffering indicator.
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Briefly: “suffering” implies “pain” (whether we use these words metaphorically 
or literally); but “pain” does necessarily imply “suffering” . “Pain” belongs to 
life’s warning systems: when I touch a hot object, the pain I feel warns me to 
pull my hand away before serious damage is done, i.e. before an antinomic 
situation replaces the regular one. (Acceptable punishment would then rather 
belong to the category o f pain than o f  suffering.) Suffering may be described as 
the pain caused by a serious and long-term antinomic situation.
Thus, whenever a (supposedly) normative social metaphor is seen to cause pain, 
we have an indication o f  an antinomic situation present or approaching. I cannot 
feel the other’s pain, therefore I have to take his/her/their communication o f pain 
seriously as an indicator that the “oughts” which govern my behaviour need 
adjustment. Undeniably Christ’s maxim o f doing unto others as you would have 
them do unto you, opens up a world o f  possibilities to swop shoes, imagining the 
consequences in terms o f  pain and suffering, so as to discover when a situation 
may be or become antinomic.
How many millions have died because o f totalitarian regimes based on an 
organistic picture o f social life? How many may have starved or have been 
marginalised (and still are), under the assumption that competition will 
automatically care for justice (not to mention stress and depression as the 
diseases of our time)?
•  D ifferentation and in tegration
Thus, over against the totalitarianistic holism o f the organistic world view, I 
would, in line with the Neo-Calvinistic tradition -  for instance A. Kuvper (1880), 
H. Dooyeweerd (1957), D.H.Th. Vollenhoven (1964), plead for acceptance o f the 
norm o f  societal differentiation and juxtaposition  (usually called “ sovereignty in 
own sphere”).
The mechanists are right -  social differentiation is normative. But one can only 
avoid an isolationist (or even disintegrationist) concept o f differentation if the 
principles o f differentiation are not located via self-interest, but through a 
thoroughgoing analysis o f the possible forms the different human relationships 
may assume, determined by all the possibilities o f interacting with, or undertaking 
responsibilities and tasks in the “world” as environment.
Differentiation, in fact, implies an involving self-assertion, and not at all a 
separation o f  institutional form s. Societal institutions speak, each in its own 
way, to mankind. Academics produce intellectual ideas about the world at large 
in a scholarly way, and in fact need their academic freedom and institutional 
autonomy for responsible involvement conforming to the demands o f scholarly 
work. No state should be happy when churches, universities, sporting bodies, 
writers associations, all willingly submit to “national ideals”, for this is an
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indication that these institutions do not care about their own tasks anymore, 
neither do they contribute freely and independently (in their own particular ways) 
to the well-being o f the state as their neighbour
Some sporting bodies love to “separate” sport from politics, and some liberals 
believe in the separation o f church from state. It is clear that they should be 
independent from one another (authority-wise and regarding their tasks), but this 
cannot mean “ separate” -  at least not in the sense that the one can act as if  the 
other does not exist, or as if the existence o f other institutions in its vicinity is not 
mirrored in its own composition and need not affect its choices. All o f the 
human-in-the-world problematic will (in any case) find expression in each social 
institution - the issue is only: how to actively take this problematic into account 
in the functioning o f  an institution.
The economic situation in a neighbourhood will find expression in the 
neighbourhood school, not only in the facilities available in the school, but also in 
the attitude which the school has towards the neighbourhood and to other 
institutions in it. A school in a poor neighbourhood might search for creative 
ways o f  teaching with minimal means, or involve the parents in the physical 
upkeep o f their school instead of asking for more cash; it might focus in its 
teaching on the transfer o f skills which may prepare the children for early entry 
into the job  market; it might even provide adult education programmes to 
improve parents’ chances to find work. But if  it wants to keep up the pretence of 
being a school, it cannot give up teaching children well, and it should resist 
attempts from other institutions to instrumentalise it for job  creation, or to prcach 
a national ideal (even the ideal to care for the poor). Yet it cannot and should not 
go about its educational task in isolationist terms. For, in the latter case, the 
expression of the neighbourhood problematic will wreak havoc in the educational 
situation itself. (A trivial example which is everyday reality in Africa: children of 
illiterate parents from a shanty town usually differ in their proficiency as well as 
their interest in reading, from those that come from middle class neighbourhoods 
with a neighbourhood library and well-educated parents; and teachers better take 
note o f this situation.)
In more general terms: the norm o f integration holds in the latter case. This 
implies that social institutions should constructively ask themselves: how does 
the full human problematic of our environment (which may be a Heideggerian 
“nearness” rather than only a physical neighbourhood) reflect itself within our 
specific differentiated task and what constructive demands does this make on the 
execution o f  our daily task?
Should an institution neglect this norm, it will surely create tensions and suffering 
in its own membership. One example: the capitalist ethic remunerates winning 
as an indication o f “excellence” . For the travelling salesman this may mean being
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compelled “voluntarily” to remain on the road away from wife and children. It 
seems to be in his interest to submit voluntarily to the interest o f  his employer -  
this is an isolationist (even disintegrationist) institutionalized demand, which 
causes suffering because it is not integration-sensitive. And the insensitivity is 
not something additional or accidental, but built into the very institutional form, 
which does not set fair standards o f a good day’s work, but leaves it to subjective 
guessing in competitive circumstances. No wonder the pendulum presently 
seems to swing in the direction o f integrationist holism!
5. Conclusion
To draw the lines together: Von Hayek has pointed out that totalitarian planners 
pretend to have an Archimedean point above their historical situation, giving them 
the encompassing knowledge of society which makes totalitarian planning 
possible, i. e. they play God to their fellow human beings. Nobody can have such 
insights and knowledge; therefore Von Hayek prefers to leave social develop­
ments to the spontaneous generation and functional adjustment o f institutions; the 
interaction o f individuals in reaction to “market” indicators empower them 
incomparably more than any planner can do (cf. Von Hayek, 1952:91-102). 
From a religious point o f view, Neo-Calvinists will probably applaud Von 
Hayek’s criticism o f totalitarianism, but will have to ask whether his idea o f the 
spontaneous adjustment o f institutions (likened to the change o f aims with which 
a footpath may be used), does not leave them wide open to instrumentalising by 
power formations other than the state, as is presently becoming practice among 
the so-called “New Right” (rightwing liberal) political groupings (cf. Vieux, 
1994). The convergence o f spontaneous institutionalising in different cultures 
seems to point to a stable range o f different possibilities given in creation: 
playing, producing art forms, adoration, the providing o f  food and shelter, 
education o f youngsters, caring for fairness, eating and drinking, producing 
offspring, intellectual thinking, building o f power formations. Neo-Calvinists will 
plead for respect for the own integrity o f these institutional possibilities, and will 
especially plead that power formations legitimise themselves in, and restrict 
themselves to the institutions in which they occur. The principle o f “ sovereignty 
in its own sphere” simply appeals for stability in disclosing the potential o f 
creation, for the recognition o f human limitations as creatures coram Deo, and for 
the recognition that the powerful institutions are not better equipped to handle the 
affairs o f  the non-powerful institutions; on the contrary, they will tend to use the 
less powerful for their own interests. This is what the norm o f differentiation 
actually wants to express.
114 Koers 62(1) 1997:91-117
J.J. Venter
Finally:
•  The norm o f differentiation and the norm o f integration are not in a dialectical 
tension with one another.
• Differentiation simply means that the institution recognises its own specific 
task in a network of relationships and continuously adjust its institutional form 
to improve the execution o f that task.
• Integration means the execution o f this task in a way which is sensitive for the 
specific contents o f the relationships in the network.
And this will sureiy be expressed in terms o f a multiplicity o f  metaphors, o f which
the metaphorical limitations have to be recognised.
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